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FUNCTIONS OF ORALITY IN AUSTRIAN
AND AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE*
ADOLF HOMBURGER**
INTRODUCTION
N the United States, orality, in the sense of oral proceedings in
open court, has been taken for granted in actions at law since the
beginning of its history. The necessity of an oral hearing follows
from fundamentals of procedure at law imported from England,
including trial by jury1 and the right to cross-examine all wit-
nesses whose testimony forms the basis of decision.2 Oral testi-
mony in open court is the traditional mode of proof-taking in
jury trials. And the psychological foundation and operational effec-
tiveness of cross-examination as a tool in the search for truth de-
pends on the spontaneity of an oral response to an oral question
in the sight and hearing of the triers of fact. The exclusionary
rules barring hearsay evidence safeguard the right to cross-examine3
by requiring direct and immediate contact of the court with the
sources of information.
In view of the firm entrenchment of orality in actions at law, it
is not surprising that the delay-ridden, secret mode of trial of is-
sues of fact by written interrogatories in equity cases in the eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries4 did not survive the merger
0' This paper was presented to the Eighth International Congress of Comparative
Law, held under the auspices of the International Academy of Comparative Law at
Pescara, Italy, on August 31, 1970. The writer expresses his gratitude to the Institute
of Comparative Law in Florence, Italy, for the hospitality extended, with the support of
the Italian Research Council and the Fondazione Agnelli, while he worked on this paper.
Credit is due to Professor Mauro Cappelletti, Director of the Institute, who invited this
contribution, for his many helpful comments and criticism, and to Dr. Viktor Hoyer of
the Austrian Ministry of Justice and Dr. Karl Bbck of the Vienna bar for valuable
information about current Austrian practice.
0* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New
York at Buffalo. D.U.J., University of Vienna, 1929; LL.B., University of Buffalo, 1941.
1. The seventh amendment of the Federal Constitution and nearly all state constitu-
tions guarantee trial by jury. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 337 (1965).
2. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3rd ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
3. Id.
4. Bentham gives the following drastic description of equity procedure:
Under the name of a bill, a volume of notorious lies delivered in, with three or
four months' time for a first answer, and after exceptions taken of course, two or
three months for a second-then amendments made to the bill, with more such
delays, and more succeeding answers-then a cross bill filed on the other side, and
a second such cause thus mounted on the shoulders of the first-then volumes heaped
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of law and equity in the United States for long. While in the proc-
ess of merger equity procedure prevailed in many other areas,, the
reverse was true as far as the manner of proof-taking was concerned.
In New York, the Constitution of 1846 abolished the Court of
Chancery and prescribed that testimony in equity cases shall be
taken in like manner as in cases at law.6 This constitutional com-
mand was carried out by New York's code of 1848.7 With the
spread in the United States of codes fashioned after the New York
model, the oral trial became the general rule in state courts in all
cases of legal and equitable origin.8 In the federal courts the
trend towards orality in equity cases started even earlier, in 1789.0
After a varied history and regressive changes back to written pro-
cedure, orality ultimately prevailed with the adoption of the Eq-
uity Rules of 1912.10
The history of orality on the European continent differs
markedly from that in the United States. In the civil law the domi-
nance of the century old written procedure of the jus commune, a
procedure quite similar to equity practice, was broken only after
a long and bitter struggle which lasted three hundred years and
upon volumes of depositions-then after years thus employed, a decree obtained, by
which nothing is decided-then the whole matter, and everything that has been
made to grow out of it, sent to be investigated in the hermetically sealed closet of a
sort of under judge called a Master-with days of attendance separated from each other
by days or weeks-length of attendance each day nominally an hour really half or a
quarter of the time .... The judge paid for three attendances and bestowing
one. .. . The party whose interest or purpose is served by delay, attending or not
attending, according as by attendance or non-attendance that interest and that pur-
pose are best served-then in the course of a few more years thus employed out of
a dozen or two of parties, one carried off by death and then another-and upon each
death another bill to be filed, and the same or similar course of retardation to
be run.
J. BENTHAm, Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, WORs (ed. Bowring)
Vi 43, quoted in 9 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LA 339 (3d ed. 1944).
Holdsworth adds that Bentham's sketch was "substantially accurate."
5. E.g., in the area of joinder of parties. See C. E. CLARK, CoDE PLEADING §§ 5i6-66
(2d ed. 1947).
6. N.Y. CONsr. art. Vi, § 10.
7. New York's Code of 1848 was drafted by the Commissioners on Practice and
Pleading, a three-man commission including David Dudley Field who was the chief
draftsman. N. Y. Laws 1848, C.379. See also C. E. CLARx, supra note 5, at 21-23.
8. The New York Code profoundly affected development of procedure in the United
States. It was adopted by the majority of the states. See A. Reppy, The Field Codification
Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS 17 (1949); C. E. CLARK, supra
note 5, at 23-31.
9. JUDIcIARY ACT § 30, 1 Stat. 88 (1789), provided for proof by oral testimony
and examination of witnesses in open court in equity cases.
10. Equity R. 46, 226 U.S. 661 (1912). See R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN HISrORICAL PERSPECTIVE 41,270-72 (1952).
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culminated in the adoption of the national codes of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.": One of the central themes of the con-
tinental reform movement was orality. As viewed by the reformists,
orality represented a new doctrine of procedure, including not
only an oral hearing-in-chief,1 2 but also the related principles of
immediacy, 3 publicity,14 concentration, 5 free evaluation of evi-
dence, 6 and augmentation of judicial authority,-7 which found
expression in varying degrees in statutory provisions.'
Today orality is firmly entrenched on the Continent as well
as in the United States. Most scholars and practitioners will agree
that civil litigation should culminate in an oral hearing conducted
before the trier of fact. However, orality in Europe is not synony-
mous with orality in the United States. While it is true that both
the American and Continental systems rely on orality, they place
different emphasis on it in the various stages of procedure. Differ-
ences pertain not only to the extent of orality, but more impor-
tantly, to its quality and nature. In short, there are sufficient
similarities and dissimilarities in the implementation of the prin-
ciple of orality to whet the appetite for comparison.
In order to provide a focus for this discussion, the American
form of orality will be critically examined and compared with
orality under the Austrian system. Austrian procedure has been
chosen for several reasons. One is purely personal. It so happens
that the author's only experiences as a practitioner were in Aus-
tria and the United States. However, there are also objective con-
siderations for the choice. Austria's famous Code of 1895 has won
international acclaim of the highest order-imitation. Its influence
extended far beyond the borders of the Austrian monarchy, affect-
ing developments of procedure in other systems to the present
11. E.g., France 1806; Germany 1877; Austria 1895; Sweden 1942.
12. E.g., OsrErumciscHE Z&VILPROZESSORDNUNG § 176 (1895) [hereinafter cited as
ZPO]. The Austrian Code of 1895 carried out a Constitutional Command that the
proceeding be oral. Fundamental Law of December 21, 1867, R.GJ31. 144, Art. X. See
Lenhoff, The Law of Evidence, 3 Am. J. CoMp. L. 313, 316 (1954).
13. E.g., ZPO §§ 412, 477 (2).
14. E.g., id. § 171.
15. E.g., id. §§ 245 (1)-(3), 134.
16. E.g., id. § 272.
17. E.g., id. §§ 183, 351, 368 (1).
18. The characteristic features of the continental codes are described in M. Cap-
pelletti's Introductory Chapter of Vol. XV, Civil Procedure of the INTERNATIONAL EN-
cYcLoPEDIA oF CoMPA, AriVE LAW, now in preparation under the auspices of the Inter-
national Association of Legal Science (unpublished manuscript, Institute of Comparative
Law, Faculty of Jurisprudence, University of Florence, Italy).
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day." Moreoer, Austria's- Cbde was drawn with great sensitiity
towards problems 'of orality. It was the first code which mde a
realistic and calculated effort to use orality beyond the area of
proof-taking.
Delineating the scope of discussion, it should be noted that the
term "orality" is employed in this paper to describe the use of
verbal communications within the framework of civil litigation.
In dealing with such communications three different functions of
orality will be identified, each of which plays a major role in one,
the other, or sometimes in both systems: (a) the employment of
orality as a means and technique of discovery of evidence before
the trial, as distinguished from production of evidence at the trial;
(b) orality as a medium for colloquy between the court, the par-
ties and their attorneys in connection with the trial of an action,
and (c) orality as a mode of proof-taking at the trial. While
these functions overlap in some .respects, it is helpful to separate
them for analytical purposes since they serve different goals and
are emphasized in varying degrees in the two systems.
The preceding enumeration'of functions of 'orality in civil
litigation is iot exhaustive. Oral communications of all sorts occur
both in Austrian and American procedure which do not fit into
the categories specified above. To illustrate, oral procedures are
utilized" in, both systems to sift contested from uncontested cases.
Examples are the calendar call in the American practice2 0 and a
major portion of the business conducted at the Austrian "initial
diet" (Erste Tagsatzung), discussed in a different context later in
this study. Also oral communications in the form of speech-making
are used in both systems in certain phases. For example, in the
American jury trial, counsel's closing statement to the jury is in the
19. E.g., the revision of the German Code of 1877 by the amendments of 1924,
"R.G.B1. I S. 135, and, particularly, 1933, R.G.B1. I S. 780, was largely inspired by the
Austrian legislation. See I STEIN-JoNAs, KOMNMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 8, 9 (18th
ed. Sch8nke 1953); SCHIMA, DIE OSTERREICHISCHE ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG im LICHTE NESJERZR
PRozmsrHEoRiE, F MsCeHsUFr ZUR FrNFZIGJAHRFEIER DER oSTERREICHISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSORD-
NUNG 250,256 (1948).
Similarly the 1942 reform of Swedish procedure was governed largely, though not
exclusively, by the principles embodied in the Austrian legislation. See R. GINSBURG &
A. BRUZELIUS, CrVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 34 n.135 (1965). Most recently the reform
-of the Greek system of procedure was influenced by the Austrian model. See Prof. Ram-
mos' lecture' on the Greek reform of civil procedure, April 23, 1964, Wiener Jurstische
•Gesellschaft, -summarized, in OJZ 1964, at 458 et seq.
20. See Prcbedngs of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial Adminis.
tration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 227-71 (1962).
-ORALITY
* nature of oratory used as a tool of persuasion.21 In general, how-
ever, oratory has been on the decline both in the AustrianF2 and
American trial of first instance. 3 On the other hand, oratory in
the form of oral arguments presented by counsel plays a role in
American pre- and post-trial motion practice, in the Austrian in-
termediate appellate practice 24 and in the American appellate
practice 25 in all instances. These and other uses of orality which
hold little attraction from a comparative viewpoint are outside the
scope of this study.
I. ORAItTY IN Am OF DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL
American pretrial procedures are broadly designed to enable
the parties to prepare for trial;2 6 in addition, they offer ample
opportunity to avoid a trial in situations suitable for pretrial dis-
position.2 T Among modern techniques serving these goals, the
21. While in theory the right to make dosing statements applies in jury as well
as in non-jury cases (see Cornwell v. Dickel, 6 N.Y. Civ. Pr. 416 (C.P. 1885); J. WEIN-
sTEIN, H. KORN, S_ A. MILLER, NEW YORK CiviL PRACTICE ff 4016.02 (1969)), as a practical
matter it has little significance in non-jury cases. See Lake Ontario Nat'l Bank v. Jud-
son, 122 N.Y. 278, 282, 25 N.E. 367, 368 (1890); J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN, & A. MILuE,
supra 4016.04. The privilege to address the jury is considered a valuable right which
must not be abridged by the court.
22. The Austrian Code contains no .explicit provision for speech-making by the
parties in first-instance trials. However, Sperl points out that the right to make a
presentation is inherent in the Code and follows from the provisions of ZPO §§ 176
et seq. See H. SPER., LEHRBUCH DER BORGERLICHEN RECiT iFLEGE 371 (1930). According
to this writer's recollection, "speeches" were rare.
23. An experienced American counsel points out that "[t]he modem methods of
practicing our profession have had a tendency to discourage court oratory and the de-
velopment of orators." F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 21 (4th ed. 1962).
24. ZPO § 486 (4). However, the parties may waive the oral hearing, id. § 492 (1).
See G. PETSCHEK & F. STAGEL, DER 6STERREICHISCHE ZIVILPROZESS 885-89 (1963). The
procedure before the court of last instance (Revisionsgericht) is written unless the court
orders an oral hearing, ZPO § 509. G. PErscHEK & F. STACEL, supra at 394-95. Since the
turn of the century this has happened only once.
25. See D. KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN ENGLAND 50-
51, 150-53 (1963).
26. Pleadings, motions for more definite statements and demands for bills of par-
ticulars in jurisdictions which follow traditional lines, and the modem pretrial con-
ference to be discussed later in this study are among devices designed primarily to
identify the subject of the cause, prepare the litigants for the trial and enable the court
to manage the litigation effectively and with concentration.
27. Motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, legal insufficiency of the claims or
defenses, or other defects which under the particular jurisdiction's governing policy are
deemed suitable for pretrial disposition are examples of motions designed to shortcut
the proceedings by accelerated judgments and avoid a full scale trial. See, e.g., FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b) [hereinafter cited as FRCP]; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW AND RulrS 3211 (Mc-
Kinney 1963) [hereinafter cited as CPLR]. A device of more recent origin is the motion
for summary judgment, available in the United States to plaintiffs and defendants, which
is aimed at the elimination of cases presenting no genuine issue of fact worthy of a trial-
See, e.g., FRCP 56; CPLR 3212 and 3213.
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oral pretrial examination of the adverse party28 and of non-party
witnesses has the greatest practical significance." It probes deeply
into the opponent's case and enables the litigants to gain access to
and tap virtually every source of information available to the other
side, including the opponent's knowledge of facts and location of
evidence. Through pretrial depositions and other disclosure de-
vices ° the parties may gather arguments and proof for use at the
highly concentrated American trial which requires the marshalling
of all means of attack and defense on one single occasion.31 More-
over, superior knowledge of facts gained through pretrial discov-
ery enables the parties to form a reliable opinion about the
strength of their cases and to make realistic and reasoned apprais-
als of the value of their claims, preparing the ground for pretrial
summary disposition where there is overwhelming strength on one
side, and for compromise when the odds are more or less even. 2
The pretrial interrogation of witnesses proceeds as permitted
at the trial, except that the scope of examination is much broader.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar provi-
28. In contrast to continental procedure, parties can be examined as witnesses in
the American procedure.
29. E.g., FRCP 30 (a). The federal rules governing discovery were amended effective
July 1, 1970. References in this paper are to the rules as amended. Under these rules,
witnesses may be compelled to attend by the issuance of a subpoena. They may also be
required, by subpoena duces tecum, to produce, for copying and inspection, documents
and other tangible things in their custody. Id. 45(d). Parties need not be summoned
by subpoena. If they fail to attend after service of a proper notice of examination under
rule 30(b)(1), they are subject to the sanctions of rule 37 (d). The notice may be ac-
companied by a request for production of documents and other tangible objects pur-
suant to rules 20 (b) and 34.
30. Pretrial discovery devices under the federal rules, in addition to deposition
of party and non-party witnesses upon oral or written questions, consist of: written
interrogatories to parties; production of documents or things or permission to enter
upon land or other property in the control of the parties, for inspection or other
purposes; physical and mental examinations of the parties or of persons in their custody
or legal control. See FRCP 26(a), 30, 31, 33-36. Pretrial discovery has out-distanced all
other devices for trial preparation. In only 7% of the cases tried in federal courts has
there not been discovery. See Professor Rosenberg's address on Changes Ahead in Federal
Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 481, 488 (1969). For the history of discovery, see Millar,
The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery, 32 ILL. L. REV. 424, 437-44 (1937); RAGLAND, DiscovERV
BEFORE TRIAL 6, 7, 13-17 (1932); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.1 (1965).
31. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 219 (2d ed. 1959) refers to the American
trial as "a single, dramatic, concentrated and uninterrupted presentation of everything
that bears on the dispute."
32. A field survey of discovery undertaken by the Project for Effective Justice of
Columbia Law School yielded no "positive evidence" that discovery promotes settlements.
43 F.R.D. 211, 220 (1967). The finding has been questioned. See Mr. Doskow's address on
Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 498, 504 (1969). In any event,
even if discovery does not promote settlements, it creates a rational basis for compromise.
Cf. 1 M. BLLT, MODERN TRIALS, § 109 (1954).
ORALITY
sions in many states,33 it extends to any matter not privileged"
that is relevant to the subject matter of the action.35 The circum-
stance that the information sought will be inadmissable at the
trial is no ground for objection. 6 Neither hearsay evidence nor
evidence tending to "fish" for information is excluded under the
Federal Rules.3 7 It is therefore true that the pretrial oral exami-
nation not only "has all the advantages which confrontary inter-
rogation has over epistolary examination," 38 but it has also many
advantages which confrontary examination at the trial stage does
not offer.
Pretrial depositions frequently are taken in successive ses-
sions, extending over a period of time as new sources of informa-
tion become available. The episodic style of the proceedings bears
some resemblance to the piece-meal fashion in which cases are often
tried under the Austrian 9 and German law.40 The similarity,
however, is only superficial. Pretrial depositions do not take place
before the court exercising adjudicatory function, or normally even
a delegated judge or master, but in most cases in law offices in the
presence of the lawyers and their clients. The stenographer who
prepares a transcript of the testimony, usually a "notary" Ameri-
can-style41 without judicial powers, acts as referee and adminis-
ters the oath to the witnesses.42 Under the Federal Rules the
33. At least thirty states have provisions for discovery identical with or similar to the
federal rules.
34. Privileged matter is excluded from discovery. See, e.g., FRCP 26 (b)(1). The
exception protects, for example, professional and governmental communications,
35. E.g., id. For a detailed discussion of the rule see 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcGMCE
26.02 [i]; 26.19-26.25 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]. Note that the scope
of examination under state practice is not always as broad as under the Federal practice.
36. E.g., FRCP 26 (b)(1), which permits discovery of information "reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
37. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). J. MOORE, FEDRAL PRAcricE
AND PROCEDURE 1049 (1962), quoting Judge Clark, states that "examination before trial
may be had not merely for the purpose of producing evidence to be used at the trial, but
also for discovery of evidence, indeed for leads as to where evidence may be located."
Under the Federal Rules this includes discovery of the identity, and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. FRCP 26(b)(1). SCHIMA, supra note 19, at
271, states that "fishing expeditions" (Erkundigungsbeweise) are not permitted in Austria.
38. J. MooRE, supra note 37, at 1109.
39. See infra note 73 et seq. and accompanying text.
40. See Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9
BUFFALO L. RiEv. 409, 409-13 (1960); Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German
Civil Procedure, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1230-31, 1233 (1958).
41. E.g., FRCP 28.
42. E.g., id. 30 (c). With respect to institutional differences between the office of
"notary" under the American and continental law, see R. SCHLSmiNGME, COMPARATIVE LAw
482 (2d ed. 1959).
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device.is normally self-administering, requiring neither court in-
tervention nor court authorization. 43 The court merely stands by
to resolve disputes as they arise between the participants.' Most im-
portantly, while both the examination before trial and proof-tak-
ing at the trial use orality in similar fashion, that is by oral
examination and cross-examination,44 they serve entirely different
purposes. Testimony at the trial is given to enable thetriers of
fact to exercise their judicial function. Examination before trial,
on the other hand, is a lawyers' device, designed to give them first
hand information about the facts and means of proof.45 Orality
thus has assumed a new dimension in American procedure. It aids
the parties in preparing cases, rather than the courts in deciding
them. Barring special circumstances, depositions which do not
qualify as admissions by the adverse party cannot be used at the
trial, except to contradict or impeach a witness in open court.
40
Normally, witnesses examined before the trial must be reexamined
at the trial. The examination before trial, therefore, does not de-
feat the principles of orality and immediacy which require that
testimony be presented directly to the organ of decision.47
The impression should not be left, however, that the pretrial
examination and other discovery devices have been absorbed by
the adversary system without struggle. It is the theory. of 'the ad-
versary system "that each litigant is most interested and will be
most effective in seeking, discovering, and presenting the materials
which will reveal the strength of his own case and the weakness of
his adversary's case so that the truth will emerge to the impartial
43. FRCP 30 (a), 30 (b)(1), 30 (b)(2), 45(d).
44. Id. 30 (c) and 43 (b).
45. Pretrial examinations must, of course, be distinguished from the private, oral
interviews of prospective witnesses conducted regularly by American lawyers or their
investigators in the absence of the adverse party and reduced to a written statement which
the questioner prepares and the examined person trustingly signs, only too often, without
even reading it. The practice of taking such statements is fraught with the danger of
abuse and improper influence. It is frowned upon, though not entirely excluded, in con-
tinental countries. In the United States, it has not only been tolerated, but moreover
judicially approved. As the eminent American judge Learned Hand pointed out, it would
be a "fantastic extreme" to consider the "universal" custom of interviewing witnesses before
trial and reducing their testimony to writing as unprofessional for an attorney in any
country. Becker v. Webster, 171 F.2d 762, 765 (2d Cir. 1949). However, it should addi-
tionally be pointed out that parties and other persons may obtain statements previously
made by them concerning the action or its subject matter, free of the limitations which
normally govern disclosure of materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.
FRCP 26 (b)(3); cf. CPLR 3101 (e).
46. E.g., FRCP 32 (a).
47. See Millar, Civil Procedure Reform in Civil Law Countries, in DAVID DUDriY
FIuEL: CENTENARY ESsAYS 125 (1949).
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tribunal that makes the decision.4 8 Disclosure, by contrast, 'is an
inquisitorial process. It compels each litigant to reveal before-the
trial, at the behest of his opponent, information tending to weaken
his own case and strengthen the opponent's case. Tension between
the inquisition-oriented disclosure and the competition-oriented
trial frequently nurtures disputes which require subtle adjust-
ment.40 Controversy centers around such matters as the relevance of
the information sought, privileges claimed as a shield against dis-
closure, sanctions for refusal to make disclosure and protection
against abusive disclosure practices. One of the most trouble-
some questions, expressive of the difficulty of preserving the ad-
versary nature of the trial and yet giving full effect to a policy of
wide-open pretrial disclosure, relates to the discovery of materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial. The United
States Supreme Court, in a landmark case, solved the dilemma by
taking a position midway between total disclosure and total privi-
lege. It granted to such materials a qualified immunity, allowing
discovery only on a substantial showing of necessity or justifica-
tion. 0 More important for the purpose of this study than the
48. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 1 (1956).
49. See address by Professor Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Discovery Prac-
tice, 45 F.R.D. 481, 484 (1969). The speaker noted that after adoption of the Federal
Disclosure Rules "a tension developed between the large objectives of the litigation
process -on the one hand, truth-finding; on the other hand, preserving a role for the
lawyer as a responsible champion of one side in a contest between adversaries."
50. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Under the Hickman doctrine, "neces-
sity or justification" exists when the denial of disclosure "would unduly prejudice the
preparation of petitioner's case or cause ... hardship or injustice." Id. at 509. The
federal rules, as amended, codify the essence of the Hickman doctrine by requiring, as
a condition of disclosure, a showing:
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the prepara-
tion of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the sub-
stantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
FRCP 26(b)(3). The rule, however, grants protection against disclosure of "the mental
impression, conclusions, opinion, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of
a party concerning the litigation," which are contained in the materials, and upholds the
right of the parties and other witnesses to obtain copies of their own statements without
any special showing. Id. See also supra note 45. As to information obtained from an expert,
a special rule governs. See FRCP 26 (b)(4). For a detailed discussion, see Advisory Com-
mittee Note, 48 F.R.D. 497, 499-505 (1970); cf. CPLR 3101 (c) and 3101 (d)(2) (New
York distinguishes between an attorney's work product and materials created in prepara-
tion for litigation-granting absolute immunity from disclosure to the former and only
qualified immunity to the latter). For further discussion of the New York rules, see J.
WEINSTEIN, H. KORN, , A. MILLER, NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 3101.42-3101A3, and
3101.50-3101.55 (1967). See also Siegel, Disclosure Under the CPLR: Taking Stock Aftdr
Two Years, ELEVENTH N.Y.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 148 (1966). With respect to
difficulties experienced in drafting the aforesaid federal-rules, see Proposed Amendments
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specific rule is the policy imbedded in the decision to preserve the
adversarial nature of the American trial, modified and weakened,
as it is, by the arrival of discovery: "[A] common law trial is and
always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly
intended to enable a learned profession to function either without
wits or on the wits borrowed from the adversary."5 1
Notwithstanding these problems, disclosure on the whole has
worked well.52 Modern lawyers could not perform the work of the
law effectively without the tool of discovery, including particularly
oral depositions. The new use assigned to orality has been chiefly
responsible for producing profound changes in the nature of the
adversary system. If, despite discovery, surprise still plays a major
role in the American trial, as some have claimed,5 3 it is not be-
cause of the unexpected use of unknown evidence, but because of
the inability of the contestants to anticipate the use which will be
made at the trial of evidence which is or should be known. The
possibility of this sort of surprise emphasizes the need of effective
representation of all litigants regardless of their economic re-
sources from the very outset of the litigation. If there is still
"drama" in American litigation, it has shifted largely from the
trial to the pretrial stage. Here it loses some of its intensity because
the sense of finality and the doomsday atmosphere of the court-
of Civil Rules, FRCP 26 (b)(3) and 26 (b)(4) and Advisory Committee Note, 43 F.R.D. 211,
224. 230-35 (1968). See also addresses by Professor Rosenberg and Mr. Freund, Changes
Ahead in Federal Discovery Practice, 45 F.R.D. 481, 484-86, 493-98 (1969); Vetter.
Changes Ahead in the Federal Rules, 56 A.B.A.J. 568 (1970).
51. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Jackson).
52. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has stated, for example, that:
The Columbia Survey [referring to a field survey undertaken by the Columbia Law
School] concludes, in general, that there is no empirical evidence to warrant a funda-
mental change in the philosophy of the discovery rules. No widespread or profound
failings are disclosed in the scope or availability of discovery. The costs of discovery
do not appear to be oppressive, as a general matter, either in relation to ability to
pay or to the stakes of the litigation. Discovery frequently provides evidence that
would not otherwise be available to the parties and thereby makes for a fairer trial
or settlement.
Explanatory Statement Concerning Proposed Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 43
F.D.R. 211, 220 (1967). See also Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L.
RV. 940, 944-46 (1961); 4 MOORE 26.02 (2); 2A W. BARRON & A. HoLmzoFv, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 641 (Wright ed. 1961). For opposing views, see Armstrong,
The Use of Pretrial and Discovery Rules: Expedition and Discovery in Federal Civil
Cases, 43 A.B.A.J. 693 (1957); Hawkins, Discovery and Rule 34: What's So Wrong About
Surprise?, 39 A.BA.J. 1075 (1953); R. FILD & B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
57 (2d ed. 1968).
53. See W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DIsCoVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYsTrEM 105-08 (1968).
ORALITY
room is missing. Trials may have become duller since the advent
of discovery, but they produce a better justice.
What is the relation of discovery to delay in court? 4 Accord-
ing to a recent survey the amount of time spent on discovery is
fairly "limited."55 However, even if discovery in itself does not
cause delay, it may well be contributing to public tolerance of
delay. Pressure for relief from court congestion would probably
be greater, were it not for the palliative of discovery. Lawyers can
get along despite excessive delay because the testimony of impor-
tant witnesses has been "canned" in the form of transcripts of the
pretrial examination, conducted in the presence of both parties.
If the witness is not available at the time of trial, the transcript
may be read into evidence; 0 but where he is available, he must
testify in person. However, the memory of the event may well
have faded when the witness finally appears in court several years
after the event. He is able to testify because he can "refresh" his
recollection by reading the transcript of his testimony before he
goes to court. The question is whether there is anything left which
can be refreshed. In many cases, time will have blotted out all
significant details. The witness, as a matter of fact and perhaps
without consciously realizing it, testifies on the basis of what he
said when he was examined before trial-not on what he remem-
bers. Orality and immediacy are the losers since the source of in-
formation available to the triers of fact in reality is the transcript
of the witness' testimony rather than his memory.
Turning to Austrian procedure, we find no device compar-
able in scope or purpose to American pretrial discovery. To be
sure, there is the Austrian Beweissicherungsverfahren-procedure
54. See H. KALVEN, H. ZEISEL & B. BucHHoLz, DELAY IN COURTS (1959). The shock-
ing condition of delay in American metropolitan courts is exemplified by the Annual
Reports of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York, which contain elaborate
statistical data. E.g., EIcHTH N.Y.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 10 (1963). Delay of three
to four years is common in the populated counties of New York City; similar conditions
prevail in the metropolitan area of Chicago, Illinois. It is interesting to note that no
comparable problem of delay exists in Austria, where the courts manage to dispose of
pending litigation in a matter of months. The average duration of a law suit in the
Gerichtsh~fen (courts above the lowest ordinary courts), for example, is reported between
144 and 147 days. Bajons, Book Review, 10 ZEiTscHPiFr FOR RECHTSvERGLEICHUNG 318, 320
(1969).
55. W. GLASER, supra note 53, at 70.
56. FRCP 32 (a)(3); CPLR 3117 (3).
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to preserve proof." As the name indicates, this is a device, for
advanced proof-taking to preserve the testimony of witnesses and
experts or the evidence obtained through a view. Proof-taking is
shifted from the hearing-in-chief to an earlier moment in order
to avoid the impending loss of the evidence through lapse of time,
as, for example, may happen with either the death of an ill per-
son or a change of the circumstances, which are the subject of
a view. 8 Anticipatory proof-taking of this sort, which is similar
to the American perpetuation of testimony," may, but need not,
antedate the commencement of the action. 0 Normally, the court
takes proof at a bilateral hearing and reduces the evidence into a
written protocol for use by both parties at a subsequent trial.0 1 It
is definitely not the purpose of the procedure to discover evidence
or to pry into the opponent's case. 2 Contrary to American dis-
closure, the Austrian device always requires a court order 3 and
depends on a showing of circumstances which justify the appre-
hension of the loss of the evidence."
However, Austrian procedure is not devoid of other tech-
niques which perform functions analagous to pretrial discovery.
To begin with, the Erste Tagsatzung (initial diet) has a disclo-
sure effect since it tends to bring certain threshold questions into
the open. The Erste Tagsatzung is the only bilateral oral hearing
which, in the Austrian higher courts of first instance, regularly
precedes the hearing-in-chief.65 Normally it serves as a sort of
57. ZPO § 389. See 3 FASCHING, KOMMENTAR ZU DEN ZIVILPRozEssFESETZN 532-44
(1966) [hereinafter cited as FAScHINO]; H. SPERL, LEHRBUCH DER BORGERLICHEN REcuTs-
PFLEGE 470-74 (1930) [hereinafter cited as SPraL]; G. PETSCHEK 8- F. STAGEL. DER OsTER.
REICHISCHE ZvLPROZESS 320-22 (1963).
58. SPERL 471.
59. E.g., FRCP 27.
60. ZPO § 384. See 3 FASCHING 536.
61. ZPO §§ 387, 388. See 3 FASCHING 540-43.
62. Likewise distinguishable from American pre-trial discovery is the Austrian "pre.
paratory proceeding" (Vorbereitendes Verfahren), ZPO §§ 245 et scq. It constitutes an
exception to the principle of immediacy in actions pending before the collegiate court in
limited situations by permitting proof-taking before a delegated single judge. The pro-
cedure has fallen into disuse and is obsolete today. See Lenhoff, The Law of Evidence, 3
Am. J. COMp. L. 313, 318 (1954).
63. ZPO § 386(1).
64. Id. § 384(1). See 3 FAsCHING 535-36. SPrRL 473 points out that the principle of
immediacy requires repetition of the evidence before the trial court in the absence of
"special obstacles or great expense." But see 3 FASCHING 544.
65. ZPO § 239. See 3 FASCHING 153-65; SPERL 533-36. In addition to holding the
"initial diet" the Austrian court's main responsibility in the pretrial phase consists in the
in camera examination of complaints filed in court in order to determine whether they
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'calendar call, American style, with enlarged agenda, interjected
between the filing of the complaint and defendant's answer. Al-
though the hearing is presided over by a judge (usually the one
who will try the case),66 it is in most cases a cut-and-dry affair
which takes only a few minutes. The court calls the cases one by
one, notes the appearances in the protocol and channels the case
towards the hearing-in-chief by directing the defendant to an-
swer the complaint. 7 There may also be a judgment by default or
by confession, a compromise or a voluntary discontinuance by the
plaintiff. The ministerial and administrative nature of the hear-
ing is underscored by the fact that the attorneys may attend it
through law clerks or clerical employees. 8 There is, however,
the possibility that the defendant or the court, sua sponte, will
raise certain threshold questions of a non-waivable nature, such
as incurable lack of competence, res judicata and lis pendens, or
that the defendant will "note" certain threshold questions of a
waivable nature, which are lost unless presented at the initial
diet.00 If so raised by the judge or "noted" by the defendant, the
plaintiff with the court's assistance has ample opportunity to dis-
cover by appropriate questions directed to his opponent" the
exact nature of the objection and to prepare adequately for the
trial of that issue either before, or at the hearing-in-chief.
Next, there is the Austrian version of "pleadings" which
serve the purpose of informing the court and the adversary of the
subject of the controversy. Under Austrian law the complaint and
the answer must contain not only a specific demand and the facts
"in detail briefly and completely" 71 on which the claims and de-
fenses are based, but also the proof "in detail" 72 which the party
intends to offer at the oral hearing-in-chief. The parties ordinarily
need not fear that they will be hamstrung by their written alle-
should be rejected or returned to the parties for correction on formal grounds (ZPO § 84)
and in making appropriate orders for proof-taking, including, in a proper case, the pro-
curement of documents, summoning of witnesses and appointment of experts (ZPO § 183).
66. In cases triable by the "Senate," a collegiate court composed of three judges
which hears cases over 100,000 Austrian shillings (approximately $4,000), the presiding
judge usually holds court at the initial diet. There is no jury in civil cases in Austria.
67. ZPO § 243 (i).
68. Id.§831(4).
69. Curable lack of competence (ZPO § 240 (1)(2)); demand for security for costs
(rd. § 59()).
70. Id. § 184.
71. Id. §§ 226 (I) ; 248(2).
72. Id.
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gations or limited to the proof specified in the writings. The
written statements are only preparatory,7" subject to change by
amendment as the facts unfold and subordinate to the oral state-
ments at the hearing-in-chief.7 4 Thus, the factual and legal content
of the cause emerges gradually over a course of time. Normally,
nothing stands in the way of new factual allegations or new offers
of proof in the light of information gained at the oral hearing-
in-chief.75 It is apparent, therefore, that in the Austrian system
orality as a mode of proof-taking at the trial performs some of
the functions of American pretrial discovery.
The flexibility of the Austrian procedure, however, is
bought at a price. If new facts are alleged and new proof is offered
as the result of "discoveries" made at the hearing-in-chief, con-
tinuances become necessary. The inevitable consequence is the
diffusion of the fact-finding process and the dilution of the prin-
ciple of concentration which Austria, like the United States,
recognizes as a prime desideratum of effective administration of
justice. Concentration demands "that the various segments of a
given cause should not be allowed to fall apart, but should be
compressed, concentrated within the shortest possible period of
time." 76 The Austrian Code recognizes the need for concentra-
tion by banning continuances on stipulation of the parties.77 Yet,
78. Id. §§ 176, 178.
74. Id. § 235. See 3 FASCHINo 104-125; SPERL 823-27. Section 235 (3) sanctions amend-
ments in the court's discretion over the opponent's objections if it will not result in undue
complication or delay (erhebliche Erschwerung Oder Verzdgerung). Professor Fasching
states that the court should permit the amendment if it is aimed at "the final and com-
plete adjustment of the litigious situation existing between the parties and if it is
appropriate to achieve that end." 3 FASCHING 122.
75. ZPO § 179. See SPERL 368-69, 398-99. The court may reject the proof if the belated
offer was made with the "obvious intent" to delay the proceedings and if the admission
of the evidence would result in "significant delay." ZPO § 179 (1). In addition, belated
offers may result in imposition of costs regardless of the outcome (the loser normally pays
for the expense of litigation, including attorneys' fees at statutory rates) and a claim for
damages in case of wanton litigation. ZPO §§ 44, 48, 49, 408. See 2 FASCHINO 850-51 (1962).
The author states on p. 851 that in actual practice successive offers of proof arc common.
Available evidence is not offered all at once, but depending upon the result of the proof
taken.
76. R. Millar, Civil Procedure Reform in Civil Law Countries, in DAVMO DuoLaE'
FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS 126 (1949) (translating and quoting from KLEIN-ENCEL, DER
ZIVsLPROZSs fEsTERREIcHs 245 (1927)). See also Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil
Procedure, 18 ILL. L. REv. 1, 24-36 (1923). Lack of concentration has been the subject
of much public concern and criticism in Germany, where the situation is aggravated by a
delay problem which does not exist in Austria. See L. ROSENBERG, ZIVILPROZESSPECHT 390-93
(10th ed. 1969).
77. ZPO § 134.
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it authorizes adjournments on specified statutory grounds. For
instance, a continuance is authorized if a party is unable to at-
tend a hearing for very substantial reasons. An Austrian writer re-
ports that courts grant adjournments freely under that provision
on motion of both parties without any showing of good cause."
Another provision covers the situation when proof which cannot
be taken immediately is essential for the continuation of the hear-
ing or when the need arises to produce documents or other
things.70 An Austrian commentator bemoans the fact that ad-
journments on this ground are granted "too generously" in actual
practice.8 0 His observations accord fully with this author's recol-
lection. Several adjournments were common in the higher courts
of first instance when the author practiced law in Vienna more
than thirty years ago. Nothing seems to have changed since then.
Undoubtedly, the commentator is also correct when he notes that
rational direction of the trial and proper preparation by the judge
should exclude the procedure, extensively used in practice, to
reserve the first day of the oral hearing-in-chief exclusively for
proof-taking orders and to adjourn immediately.8' It is less clear
how frequent adjournments can be avoided in a system which
frowns upon private pre-litigation interviews of witnesses, de-
emphasizes the significance of the writings exchanged before the
oral hearing, provides no means for pretrial discovery, and rarely
puts obstacles in the way of amendments of pleadings and supple-
mental offers of proof during the progress of the proceedings. Jus-
tice would suffer if the parties were precluded from changing
position midway in the proceedings under the impact of unex-
pected developments in the proof. Moreover, the judge's partici-
pation in the search for truth by suggesting new legal approaches
and the tapping of new sources of evidence not anticipated by the
parties may have a de-concentrating effect. Episodic proof-taking
and continuances seem unavoidable under the circumstances. Yet,
breaks in the continuity of the proceedings, even of a compara-
tively short duration, may be a setback to the principle of orality
which favors fact-finding under the immediate impact of live
proof. Making due allowance for the failings of human memory,
a judge who examines dozens of witnesses in other pending cases
78. SCHrmA, supra note 19, at 256.
79. ZPO § 134(3).
80. 2 FASCHING 699.
81. Id.
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between adjournments may find it difficult to retain all the verbal
and non-verbal nuances and imponderables on which the free
evaluation of the credibility and accuracy of oral testimony de-
pends. In the end, he may well decide the case on the basis of the
written summary protocol of the hearings, commonly used in Aus-
tria, rather than on his own recollection. Thus, the Austrian pro-
cedure presents the somewhat heterogeneous picture of a system
which espouses concentration, and yet is structured in a way that
often frustrates it.
II. TRIAL BY COLLOQUY
Perhaps the most perplexing task which Austria's famous
draftsman Franz Klein faced in drafting the Austrian Code of
Civil Procedure was the delineation of functions of the court and
the parties in a system intended to combine features of party-pres-
entation and court-prosecution. The principle of party-presen-
tation is the procedural companion of a system of substantive law
built on recognition of private rights and duties. It guarantees
to the plaintiff the right to decide whether to sue, whom to sue
and what to sue for; and to the defendant the corresponding right
to admit plaintiff's claim or resist its enforcement. Destruction
of the principle of party-presentation would cause the downfall of
the entire system of private rights and duties. The principle of
court-prosecution, on the other hand, recognizes an overriding
public interest in the just, speedy and inexpensive determina-
tion of civil actions. To Franz Klein, a legal controversy was a
social ill for which the substantive law provided the remedy. Pro-
cedure then performs the role of the physician who diagnoses the
illness and prescribes the cure as a social service for the good of
society as well as the individual litigants. 82 Recognizing the in-
terest of the general public in the performance of that service, the
principle of court-prosecution charges the court with the duty
to vindicate the public interest independent of, and at times in
conflict with, the will of the parties. The two principles are not
irreconcilable; but their co-existence creates tensions and fric-
tions which require careful balancing.
Franz Klein was fully aware of the need for subtle adjust-
ment. He created a system which accepts the thesis that it is for
82. KLEIN-ENGEL, DER ZIVILFROZESS 6ESERREICHS 190 (1927).
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the parties, and only for them, to determine the content of the
cause (principle of party-presentation), s However, he tempered
that fundamental rule by mixing into the system a solid dose of
court initiative, which gives the court a significant role in shap-
ing the case and assembling the proof (court-prosecution). 4
Once the action is started, the court, to a large extent, assumes
responsibility for its progress. It sets the date of hearings, 5 ap-
proves adjournments"8 or extensions of time,8 7 and determines
by proof orders whether, in what sequence, and at what stage of
the trial proof offered by the parties shall be taken.88 It partici-
pates in the presentation of proof by examining witnesses and
experts0 (a feature to be discussed in greater detail later in the
study), and generally supervises, all steps in the procedure. 0
Moreover, while the parties alone determine the scope of con-
tested issues, and while they retain the right to withdraw the case
from the court at any time and carry the main burden of assem-
bling the evidence,91 the court has significant sua sponte powers
of an inquisitorial nature. Foremost among these are the powers
to appoint experts, to order a view contrary to the will of the
parties92 and, unless objected to by both parties, to call witnesses
and procure documents under specified conditions.9 3
In addition, and most important, Franz Klein's Code gave
birth to a unique feature which was destined to become a leading
characteristic of the German Code as well as the Austrian-trial
by colloquy of the court and the litigants. This new technique
finds its statutory expression in section 182 of the Austrian
Code. 4 It makes the judge a sort of informal collaborator with
carefully measured assistential and advisory duties, reserving,
however, to the litigants the ultimate decision in shaping the case.
83. Id. at 170.
84. Id. at 192.
85. ZPO §§ 130 et seq.
86. Id. § 134.
87. Id. §§ 128,243.
88. Id. §§ 277, 278, 444. See SPERL 397-400.
89. See SPERL 400.
90. Id. at 364-70.
91. Id. at 360, 376.
92. ZPO § 183 (1) [4].
93. Id. §§ 183 (1) [2,3], (2).
94. ZPO § 182, para. 1. This paragraph provides that:
At the oral hearing the presiding justice shall see to it, through questions or other
means, that the factual statements relevant to the decision are made, or insufficient
statements in support or defense of the claim supplemented, that the means of proof
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The method employed is not foreign to American law teachers
versed in the Socratic method of legal education. The judge may
summon the parties to appear at the trial, but under the Aus-
trian law he has no power to compel them to come. 5 He has the
duty to discuss the case thoroughly" and to ask questions de-
signed to lead the parties to a better understanding of their claims
and defenses; the parties, however, need not answer the ques-
tions. 7 He must use every effort to assure that the parties make
a full statement of all pertinent facts and produce the evidence
essential to establish their claims and defenses; the parties need
not, however, take the advice, well-meant as it may be.98 Ques-
tions are not the sole means of judicial tutoring envisaged by the
Code. The judge may also accomplish the statutory purpose by
"other means."9 9 Suggestions, comments and instructions from
the bench seem to be appropriate. 10 The statutory purpose to
encourage a meaningful three-cornered dialogue is complemented
by the right of the parties to direct questions to each other and
by their obligation to be truthful.101
In this connection the function of the judge as a peace-maker
should not be overlooked. In harmony with the policy of curbing
the "social evil" of litigation and in keeping with the active role
assigned to the judiciary in civil litigation, the Austrian Code
authorizes the judge, at any stage of the litigation, to attempt an
amicable adjustment of the controversy, be it by compromise,
confession of judgment or discontinuance. The statute is not in the
least squeamish about the judge's function as a promoter of set-
tlements. It states expressly that he may act on motion or on his
own initiative.0 2
are specified or proof offered supplemented and that generally all explanatory state-
ments are made which appear necessary for the correct ascertainment of the facts
underlying the rights and claims of the parties.
Cf. GERAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 139 (a translation of which appears in Kaplan,
von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure 1, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1224
(1958)).
95. ZPO § 183 (1) [1]. See PETscHEKSTAGEL, supra note 57, at 225 (matrimonial and
status cases are the exception) ; SPERL 363.
96. ZPO § 180 (3) provides in part: "The presiding justice must see to it that the
cause is discussed to the fullest extent.
97. See 2 FAsCoHING 872.
98. Id. at 870.
99. zPo § 182 (1).
100. See 2 FASCHING 872.
101. ZPO §§ 184, 178. See SPzRL 373-76.
102. ZPO §§ 239 (2), 204 (1). See also id. § 433.
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Ingeniously devised, as it is, the Austrian system neverthe-
less demonstrates the problems encountered in combining the
principle of court-prosecution with a system of party-presenta-
tion. The Austrian judge in performing his statutory duties has
the unenviable task of feeling his way along the dim border-line
between asking too many or too few questions, explaining too
much or too little, and giving too much or not enough advice and
assistance. Any significant deviation from the allowed course in
one or the other direction may taint the proceeding with rever-
sible error.10 3 There is no doubt that the statute means busi-
ness when it directs the judge in absolute terms to see to it by
the means indicated that all operative facts are presented to the
court, that the proof is properly specified and that all explana-
tions are given in order to enable the court to ascertain the
objective truth.10 4 Incompleteness, incomprehensibility and in-
consistency of factual allegations, as well as indefinite or self-
contradictory demands, appear to be within the scope of the
court's corrective and advisory duties. 0 5 In no event may the
court spring a surprise upon the parties by applying a legal the-
ory not previously discussed with them which would have re-
quired further proof-taking.' However, in performing these
statutory duties, the judge must tread cautiously. By all means
he must avoid the appearance of partiality. It would, therefore, be
improper if in the give-and-take of the oral discussions he would,
so to speak, put specific motions into the mouths of the parties
or if he would act as if he were the litigant's lawyer. 07 His ques-
tions should keep within the claims presented and respect the
parties' will in selecting means of attack or defense, 08 although
it has been suggested that the judge in putting "informative
questions" may go beyond the matters covered by the plead-
ings.1°9 And since the questions are for information only and do
not constitute proof, the limitations which normally govern
103. Id. § 496 (1) [2,3]; (3). See 2 FAscHING 873; SPERL 641-42.
104. ZPO § 182 (1), supra note 94.
105. See 2 FASCHING 870-71, 873.
106. 20.II.1963, 6 Ob 292/63, OJZ 1964, at 238. See also 2 FASCHING 874. Cf. Diemer v.
Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 168 N.E.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960). (In an action for separa-
tion which was pleaded, tried and appealed on a theory of cruel and inhuman treatment,
New York's highest court granted a separation on the ground of abandonment.)
107. 10.9.1959, 6 Ob 249/59. See 2 FASCFUNG 871.
108. See 2 FASCHING 870, 872.
109. Id. 872.
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proof-taking by examination of the parties do not apply in put-
ting the questions.1 ' While it has been said, on the one hand,
that the judge is under no obligation to advise parties represented
by counsel concerning the allegations necessary to support their
claims or defenses,"" the courts have also made it clear that
the judge's responsibility under section 182 is by no means
limited to parties appearing without counsel and that the court
is always free to warn the parties of procedural pitfalls
even if they have lawyers." 2 It is no wonder that a commentator,
anticipating the misgivings of the student who is confronted with
the opaque and contradictory state of the law, attempts to put his
mind at rest by placing the court's assistant and advisory func-
tion in the category of "imponderable expressions of a sense of
values."" 3 The trouble is that it is not the trial judge's sense of
values that counts, but that of the appellate court which reviews
the conduct of the trial judge, and that it is very difficult to gauge
another person's sense of values which is guided by moral and
ethical, rather than legal precepts.
What is the lesson to be learned from the Austrian experi-
ence? Franz Klein's notion of trial by colloquy is brilliantly
conceived. Its gentle operation by questions, suggestions and advice
puts it in sharp contrast to a system of "authoritative tutor-
ship 11 4 which forces justice upon the litigants rather than dis-
penses it to them. Trial by colloquy "humanizes" the relation
between the judge and the litigants; it enables him to function
beyond hearing and deciding cases; it places him in a position
where he can aid a litigant whose lack of skill or resources puts
him at an unfair disadvantage; and it provides a corrective device
against the harshness of the adversary system without transform-
ing it into a bureaucratic, inquisitorial system.
On the debit side, it appears from the preceding discussion
that the execution of Franz Klein's idea in actual practice has
proved more difficult than its originator may have anticipated.
When a judge, in exercise of his decisory function, plays an active
110. Id.
111. 20.3.1957, JBL. 1957 at 647. See 2 FASCHING 871.
112. 13.3.1924, SZ. VI 107; 24.1.1933, ORZ.1933 at 195. But see 5.1.1937, ORZ.1937 at
107 and OLG. Vienna 9.9.1935, Ev BL. 1935 No. 831. See 2 FASCHING 870-71.
113. 2 FASCHING 871. Cf. ScHIMA, supra note 19, at 270.
114. See ROMELIN, RECHTSPOLITIK UND DOKTRINE IN DF.R BORGRLICIIEN RECImrrsPFLEcE
31 et seq. (1926).
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role in the presentation of the case, he is close to the point where
the integrity of the adversarial process is in jeopardy. The poten-
tiality of the colloquy method for relieving the extremes of the
adversary system and equalizing the opportunities of the litigants
must be weighed against the risk of judicial over-involvement in
the partisan efforts which threatens the integrity of the judicial
process. The Austrian courts, in seventy-five years of experience,
have not been able to define the-court's powers and duties clearly
for guidance of the judiciary. The uncertain dimension of the prin-
ciple of judicial guidance in Austria may be responsible for its
uneven implementation by the courts. According to this writer's
recollection, it was not a frequent practice for Austrian judges to
carry on extensive discussions with the parties as envisaged by the
Code, at least when they were represented by attorneys. Informa-
tion gathered from lawyers presently engaged in practice in Aus-
tria tends to confirm this recollection.
The American institution which comes nearest to utilization
of the colloquy method is the pretrial conference. This device,
which is available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" 5
and under a number of state provisions," 6 might be likened to a
pretrial agenda meeting called by the court to give direction to
the proceedings and establish a cooperative pattern for the
conduct of the trial.117 Included among its objectives are the iden-
tification and simplification of the issues of law and fact, under-
standings between the court and the parties concerning modes of
proof, order of presentation, limitation of the number of expert
witnesses, the projected length of the trial and similar matters.
Usually the meeting is informally conducted in the hope that a
spirit of cooperation will prevail. As one writer aptly points out,
pretrial "best succeeds when the judge thinks not in terms of
power, but of persuasion; not in terms of his authority, but of
reason.""" Frequently the pretrial judge is not the same judge
115. FRCP 16.
116. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 269.65 (1957); MINN. R. CIv. P. 16 (1958).
117. The pretrial conference is discretionary in some jurisdictions and mandatory in
others. For a summary of federal practice see J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE
ch. 18 (1962). For a bibliography see M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND
EFFEcrE JusricE 230 (1964). See also Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.
1961) (where the policy underlying the pretrial conference is explained).
118. Louisell, Discovery and Pretrial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV.
633, 664 (1952).
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who will preside at the trial. The position of the pretrial judge is
far less sensitive if he does not participate in the determination of
the merits. The conference culminates in a pretrial order which
sums up the results of the conference, including the court's direc-
tions pertaining to the forthcoming trial.119
As mentioned before, the Austrian Code provides for judi-
cial promotion of settlements. By contrast, the word "settlement"
does not appear in the Federal Rule governing the pretrial con-
ference. The Americans have not reached a consensus concerning
the judge's role in proposing or urging settlements. However, in-
formal discussions between the parties in the presence of the
judge and with his active participation quite naturally create a
favorable atmosphere for exploring the possibility of settle-
ment. Since discovery normally precedes the pretrial conference,
the parties may welcome the opportunity "to talk settlement"
without losing face, at a moment when they can appraise realis-
tically the chances of victory.120
While American procedure uses colloquies of the court and
counsel to advantage in the pretrial phase, it does not, in general,
carry this mode of communication beyond the pretrial confer-
ence. The tense atmosphere of the tightly structured and highly
concentrated American trial does not invite relaxed, informal
discussions in conference style. In jury trials, particularly, fre-
quent dialogues between the court and the litigants would in-
terrupt the flow of the evidence and might be a source of
annoyance and confusion to jurors. Moreover, the American
variety of the adversary system which reaches for the truth
through the litigants' competitive quest for victory favors a sep-
aration of functions of the court and the parties, assigning the
task of assembling and presenting the proof to the parties, and of
drawing conclusions from the evidence to the court or the jury.
Participation by the judge in the process of collecting the cause
materials and his engagement in colloquies with the litigants in
an assistant and advisory capacity would blur to some extent
119. Undoubtedly the flexible wording of the federal rule permits the granting of an
accelerated judgment disposing of the entire litigation or of some of the issues in a proper
case. See Louisell, supra note 118, at 662.
120. A study undertaken by Professor Rosenberg came to the conclusion that the
pretrial conference does not increase the number of settlements or shorten the trial time.
M. RosENBERG, supra note 117, at 67-70. For a contrary view, see A. LEVIN & E. WVOOLEY,
DISPATCH AND DELAY 63-66 (1961).
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the traditional separation of functions. It might also compromise
the judge's impartiality in fact or, at least, in appearance.,' One
must not forget that the American judge, contrary to the Austrian
career judge, comes from the ranks of practitioners whose busi-
ness it is to be good partisans. It takes little to awaken the advo-
cate's instinct in a judge reared in the tradition of the American
adversary system once he takes a position in the ring. American
judges therefore are reluctant to act as "guidance counselors" to
litigants. Depending on their temperament and disposition, they
assume a more or less passive role. Like spectators, they see and
hear the actors and pass judgment on their performance, but
they do not get into the act. They do, however, maintain strict
discipline and decorum among the jury and the litigants, and ac-
cept responsibility for moving cases along expeditiously through
tight calendar control, dismissals for failure to prosecute and sim-
ilar techniques. When the controversy affects public interest or
when one of the adversaries is at a distinct disadvantage because
of a glaring disparity of resources, the court might even abandon
its position of aloofness and participate in the proof-taking proc-
ess by asking supplementary questions or, in rare cases, call for
the production of evidence not offered by the parties.122 Occasion-
ally the court may also engage in informal discussions with the
parties during the progress of the trial. For example, in a jury
trial there may be a "huddle" of the court and the lawyers out-
side the hearing of the jurors to discuss special problems, or the
court may order an interruption of the trial to give to the court
and the lawyers an opportunity to meet in chambers for a con-
ference, usually concerned with the possibility of a settlement.
Such interludes, however, are not a regular feature which the law
prescribes or even encourages. At the present time the average
American case is tried by the parties before the court and not,
as in Austria, by the judge with the cooperation of the parties.
By separating the stage of colloquy from the trial stage the Ameri-
can procedure avoids the problems of the Austrian judge, but it
121. Cf. L. Fuu.E, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENcE 706-08 (1949). See also Wyzanski,
A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HAav. L.i.Rv. 1281 (1952).
122. See Johnson v. United States, 33 U.S. 46, 81-94 (1948) (dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter); Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on the Comparison of
Systems, 9 BurFA.o L. Rav. 409, 423 (1960). See also infra notes 158-61, and accompanying
text.
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also loses many of the benefits derived from a continuing dia-
logue.
III. ORALITY As MODE OF PROOF-TAKING
Both Austria and America rely on oral testimony in open
court as the basic mode of proof-taking at the trial. The advan-
tages of oral presentation of the evidence directly to the decisory
organs have been stressed time and again and require no further
elaboration in this study. However, the two systems differ sharply
in their methods of producing and interrogating witnesses. The
differences are not merely formal. They reflect the contrasting
roles of the court and the parties under the Austrian and Ameri-
can variants of the adversary system, the former being modified
significantly by elements of court-prosecution while the latter
preserves the principle of party-prosecution with only minor de-
viations.
In Austria, no witness can be placed on the stand unless the
judge first orders that his testimony be taken. While normally
the parties offer the witnesses, it is for the court to admit the testi-
mony and define the subject of proof by a proof order. It bears
repetition that no finality attaches to the proof order. 20 The
court may rescind or change it in the course of the proceedings
and make new orders from time to time as the exigencies of the
case may require.24 Normally the court summons the wit-
nesses,1' although occasionally a party offers a witness at a hear-
ing-in-chief and simultaneously informs the court that the
witness is present and ready to testiy 12  In most instances, the
witnesses have neither been interrogated, let alone "prepared"
by the lawyer. 27 Once the court determines to hear a witness, he
is the court's witness.O The common law rule against impeach-
ment of the credibility of one's own witness120 is unknown in
Austria. The court may also call a witness on its own motion, but
123. ZPO §§ 277-78.
124. See supra notes 73-75, and accompanying text. See also Lenoff, The Law of EvL-
dence, 3 Am.. J. Com.p. L. 313, 323-28 (1954).
125. ZPO §§ 329-31.
126. In general, however, this practice is looked at as being contrary to the draft-
man's intention. See 3 FAscHING 440-41; SPER. 436.
127. Cf. note 45 supra.
128. See 3 FASCHING 441.
129. C. MCCORMtICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 70-73 (1954).
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he cannot be interrogated if both parties object.30 The latter
provision is incompatible with the spirit of the Austrian Code.
It is worth noting that Franz Klein's original draft gave the judge
the explicit and unlimited power to call a witness from whom he
expects information concerning relevant facts, on his own mo-
tion, at any stage of the proceedings.1 31
In the United States there is no proof order. The clerk of
the court, at the attorney's request or, in some jurisdictions, the
attorney acting as officer of the court, summons the witnesses by
issuing a subpoena.131 Quite frequently the parties bring wit-
nesses to the trial. The party "offers" the witness simply by placing
him on the stand and asking questions. 3 3 Interrogation pro-
ceeds under the court's reasonable control,14 subject to the
opponent's objections on appropriate grounds.' 35 It is normal
practice for the lawyers to interview beforehand those witnesses
on whom they intend to rely at the trial and to obtain their writ-
ten statements. 3 6 Moreover, as previously discussed, 37  pre-
trial examination of some or all the witnesses frequently precedes
proof-taking at the trial. In one respect the judge's powers are
broader -than in Austria. It seems that, in theory at least, he may
call a witness not offered by either party and interrogate him even
over-the protest of both parties. 38
By far the -most important distinction between Austrian and
American proof-taking relates to the mode of interrogating wit-
nesses. --In Austria the judge conducts the primary interroga-
tion.;30  He is required to explore the relevant facts by
appropriate questions which extend not only to the source of the
witnesses' knowledge (hearsay, subject to free evaluation, is ad-
130. ZPO § 183 (2).
131. See SPRL 362-63.
132. ,E.g., FRCP 45; CPLR 2301, 2302. The statutes and rules of several states are
reviewed in N.Y. TEMPORARY COMM'N, FIRSr PRELIMINARY REPORT 353 (1957).
133. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, at 112-13.
134. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED FED. RuLEs OF EVIDENCE],
Rule 6-11 (a) and Advisory Committee's Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 302-03 (1969).
135. E.g., FRCP 46; CPLR 4017. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 129, at 115-22.
136. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, at 2, 10.
137. See text accompanying notes 26-54 supra.
138. See 3 WimoRE 784; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 129, at 12-14; J. MAGuiRE, et al.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 737-39 (5th ed. 1965); PROPOSED FED. RuLEs OF Evi-
DENcE, Rule 6-14 and Advisory Committee's Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 310-11 (1969).
139, It is generally the practice in European countries that the trial judge conducts
most of the questioning. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATtvE LAW 224-25 (2d ed. 1959).
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missable) and to the immediate theme of proof, but also to mat-
ters affecting the witnesses' reliability and truthfulness.1 40 It is
quite common that the judge starts the interrogation by inviting
the witness informally, though under the sanction of criminal
prosecution for false testimony or perjury,141 to tell his story in
-his own words, interrupting him only occasionally when he gets
too general or too prolix, and following the witness' narrative
with specific questions. After the judge has finished his exam-
ination, the parties, subject to the court's control, may ask
supplementary questions limited to the cause materials and their
probative force. 42 Usually the parties' subsidiary questioning is
restrained and brief. There is no cross-examination in the Ameri-
can sense. Like Daniel who interrogated Susannah's accusors sep-
arately, thereby preventing them from conforming their
testimony, the Austrian judge normally sequesters the wit-
nesses. 143 Confrontation of witnesses who gave conflicting testi-
mony is permitted. 44 In general, since most of the questioning
originates from a neutral source, the tense and nervous atmo-
sphere of the "battle of wits" between the examiner and the wit-
ness, characteristic of the American cross-examination, is missing
at the Austrian trial.
In the United States the procedure is exactly the reverse.
Primary questioning originates with the parties who interrogate
the witnesses alternately. 4 The basic philosophy is that adver-
sary questioning is likely to divulge the relevant facts bearing on
the issue since each party strives for victory and therefore will
make every- effort to bring all facts favorable to his side of the
case to the court's attention. Unfortunately, it is also true that
each party, prompted by the desire to win, has a vital interest to
suppress relevant but unfavorable information. In any event, the
successful operation of adversarial proof-taking presupposes that
the parties are evenly matched. As Professor Morgan put it, "if
140. ZPO § 340; see SPERL 438.
141. AUSTRIAN PENAL LAW § 199 lit. a.
142. ZPO §§ 289, 341 (1). See SPsRL 437-89, 400.
143. ZPO § 339 (2). This is contrary to the normal American practice. See E. CLEARY
& J. STRONG, EVIDENCE 399 (1969). The PROPOSED FED. RuLES OF EVIDENCE contain a
discretionary provision for sequestration in Rule 6-15. See 46 F.R.D. 161, 811-12 (1969).
144. ZPO § 839 (4).
145. Normally, the examination of a witness proceeds in four phases, the direct
examination by the party who produced the witness, the cross-examination by his oppo-
nent, the re-direct examination by the former, and the re-cross-examination by the latter.
See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 129, at 6-7.
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[the adversarial system] . ..were to operate perfectly, both parties
would have the same opportunities and capacities for investiga-
tion, including the resources to finance them, equal facilities for
producing discoverable materials, equal good or bad fortune
with reference to availability and preservation of evidence, and
equal persuasive skill in the presentation of evidence and argu-
ments." 146
The most controversial part of the American interrogation
process is the cross-examination which exploits the possibilities
of orality in proof-taking to the very limit. Since the initial ex-
amination is conducted by the party who produced the witness,
the cross-examination is the necessary complement, affording to
the adversary the opportunity to test the accuracy, completeness
and credibility of the testimony. -Style and technique range from
soft and cunning persuasion to brow-beating and intimidation.
The leading question is the staple technique of the cross-ex-
aminer. Attention to minute detail and painstaking, in-depth
analysis of factual issues are earmarks of the American method.
In general, the courts allow the lawyers great latitude in ques-
tioning, although the witness is entitled to the court's protection
if he is harassed unduly or exposed to unfair tactics.147
Whether the sharply accentuated style of the Americans or
the gentle approach of the Austrians is more likely to bring out
the truth is a moot question. Cross-examination has received lav-
ish praise from eminent jurists since the days of Bentham.148
Wigmore asserted that"no safeguard for testing the value of hu-
man statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-exami-
nation.' 1 49 In his opinion, "cross-examination, not trial by jury,
is the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American
law."' 0 A prominent trial lawyer referred to cross-examina-
tion as "a bulwark of liberty" and "an incomparable art.' 151
Case law is unanimous in stating that a party must not be de-
146. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS .OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMEuCAN SYSTEM OF
LtIGATION 34 (1956).
)47. Literature on cross-examination abounds. For an elaborate exposition, see 5
Wxo6Ao §§ 1367-94; 6 Wi, ioRE §§ 1884-94. For a concise summary of the American law,
see C. MCCORMICr, supra note 129, at §§ 19-82.
148. J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE b. II, c. IX; b. III, c. XX (J.S.
Mill ed. 1825).
149. 5 WimGoRE 29.
150. Id.
151. L. STRYKER, ThE ART OF ADVOCACY 65, 85 (1954).
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prived of the "invaluable privilege" of cross-examinatiori which
is "the crucial test of credibility.' ' 5 2 Yet, cross-examination
which rests on adversarial, high-pressure questioning of witnesses
by the litigants should not be confused with accessibility of the
witnesses to both parties which, indeed, is an essential attribute
of the principle of a bilateral hearing. If cross-examination really
is "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth,"lss one wonders why other legal systems have not im-
ported that fabulous "engine." The Swedes, who in practice, at
least, permit the parties to conduct the initial examination, have
modified the Anglo-American technique of cross-examination
by permitting the witness to narrate the story in his own words,
rather than by responding to specific questions. 4 Even in the
United States the protective taboos which surround cross-exami-
nation have not deterred sharp criticism from well-informed
sources. Some experts in the field have pointed to the limited
utility of cross-examination as compared to the overwhelming
importance of testimony elicited on direct examination."' Oth-
ers have questioned the integrity of the device pointing an- accus-
ing finger at its potential for mischief and gross abuse.""0 They
have received unintended support from a mass of how-to-do-it
literature that gives advice on how, by mastering the, "att" of
cross-examination, lawyers might win cases which they: should
lose if justice prevailed. 57  J, .
Probably the most effective counter-measures against 4arm-
ful effects of adversarial proof-taking within the framework of the
existing adversary system should be the more liberal exercise of
152. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
153. 5 WIGMORE 29.
154. R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 288 (1965). Denmark
and Norway likewise provide for examination by the lawyers. BRUNS, ZIVILI'ROZE&qE.CIIT
329-30 (1968), favors the introduction of examination, cross-examination and re-examina-
tion by the attorneys in German practice.
155. J. REED, CONDUCT OF LAWSUITS 276 (2d ed. 1912). C. McCoRIcK, supra note
129, at 59, asserts that cross-examination today is primarily "the means of gleaning addi-
tional facts from the opponent's witnesses" but that "it no longer looms as a determinant
of victory." See also id. at 8-9.
156. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-102 (1949); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129,
at 59-60; H. TAFT, WITNESSE IN COURT 81 (1934).
157. See J. FRANK, supra note 156, at 82, where it is stated that:
Longnecker, in his book HINTS ON THE TRIAL OF A LAwsurr (a book endorsed by the
great Wigmore), in writing of the 'truthful, honest, over-cautious' witness, tells how
a 'skillful advocate by rapid cross-examination may ruin the testimony of .4uch a
witness.
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the court's common law power to ask questions at any stage of the
proof-taking process and to require, where appropriate, testi-
mony by free narrative in preference to specific questions on the
direct examination by the party who produced the witness.
It is generally assumed today that the judge has the power to
interrogate witnesses,5 8 whether called by himself' 59 or by a
party. 60 However, does he exercise that power? This writer's
limited experience, based on observations in the State of New
York and random sampling of records on appeal, indicates that
judges use the right of interrogation most sparingly and cau-
tiously. Judge Frank confirms that "the court relies almost entirely
on such evidence as one or the other of the private parties to the
suit is . . .able to and . . . chooses to offer."'' Virtually
every book on cross-examination, including the how-to-do-it va-
riety, cautions the young and inexperienced lawyer that the "crit-
ical" decision is whether or not to cross-examine. 162  One
wonders if that decision would be as momentous as it apparently
is, if judges were to abandon their passive attitude with respect
to participation in the questioning. There are, of course, rea-
sons for the judge's reluctance to be drawn into the proof-taking
process. Some have already been mentioned. 163 It might be added
here that American judges, most of whom were district attorneys
or trial lawyers before ascending the bench, are attuned to cross-
examination and generally disinclined to curtail its effectiveness
by questions from the bench. Moreover, they apprehend that
questions would be construed as subrosa attempts to circumvent
158. See C. MCCoRMiCK, supra note 129, at 12-13; J. MAGUIE, supra note 138, at
787-89; 8 WIGMORE § 784; Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 6-14 of the PROPosED FED.
RuLES oP EViDENCE, 46 F.R.D. 161, 310-11 (1969).
159. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, at 14; J. MAGumE, supra note 138, at 303-04;
9 WxIMOnF § 2484. But see Lenhoff, supra note 62, at 326.
160. PRoPosED Fan. RuLEs oF EvIDENcE, Rule 6-14, would expressly provide:
(a) CALUNG BY JUDGE. The judge may, on his own motion or at the suggestion of
a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus
called.
(b), IN1TERROGATION BY JUDGE. The judge may interrogate witnesses, whether called
by. himself or by a party. The parties may object to questions so asked and to
evidepce thus adduced at any time prior to the submission of the cause.
46 F.R.D., 161, 810 (1969). With respect to judicial power to interrogate witnesses, the
Advisgry Committee states, "the authority of the judge to call witnesses is well estab-
lished,"...'d.
.61.. J. FRANK, supra note 156, at 96.
162, 5.WIMORE § 85. .
163. See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
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a prohibition against commenting on the evidence, in effect in
many jurisdictions.1 64 Even in states where judges are free to
comment on the evidence they must be careful not to assume the
role of the advocate.1 65
Turning to the form of testimony it seems clear that the
court's right to supervise questioning by counsel includes the
power to require testimony by free narrative on the direct exam-
ination.'66 A witness who speaks freely and, without interrup-
tion is more likely to reveal the truth than one who gives
rehearsed replies to rehearsed questions, carefully phrased to
avoid divulgence of unfavorable information.Looking into the future, and considering the possibility of
departing from the frame-work of the present system, the time
may be ripe to bring together psychologists and lawyers in an
extended cooperative effort to measure and evaluate by scientific
methods the effect of cross-examination on the human mind. The
results of such a study may enable us to pass value judgments
based on more than "[t]he belief, or perhaps hope, that cross-
examination is effective in exposing imperfections of perception,
memory, and narration ... .7
CONCLUSION
The principle of orality viewed in historical perspective
stands for a whole program of reform. It was the battle cry of an
164. See 9 WicMoRE §§ 2551, 2551 (a). As to the federal courts' right to comment on
the evidence, see 5 MooRE ff 51.07; J. MAGUIRE, supra note 138, at 737-40; VANDERBILT
'INIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 224-29 (1949). Cf. PROPOSED FE. RULES
OF EvDEac, Rule 1-05, 46 F.R.D. 161, 191-92. (1969).
165. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, at 13. Cf. Advisory Committee's Note to
Rule 6-14 of the PRoPosED FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE, warning that the judge's authority
to ask questions would be abused when the judge assumes the role of advocate. 46 F.RD.
161, 311 (1969); Gibson v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 378 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1967).
166. See Advisory Committee's Note to PRoPoSED FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 6-11,
46 F.R.D. 161, 303 (1969); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 129, at 8-9.
167. PROPOSED FED. RULES OF EvIDExcz, Introductory Note to Art. VIII: Hearsay, 46
F.R.D. 161, 325 (1969). Literature on the psychology of testimony is cited in M. CAt'-
PELLETTi, LA TESTIMONIANZA DELLA PARTE NEL SISTEMA DELL'ORALITA 183 n.10 (1962). See
references to staged experiments relating to reliability of testimony elicited by free
narrative, direct and cross-examination cited in C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, at 59 nA.
See also Slovenko, Witness, Psychiatry and the Credibility of Testimony, 19 U. FLA. L.
Rxv. 1 (1966); Haward, Some Psychological Aspects of Oral Evidence, 3 BrrIsT JOURNAL
OF CRIMINOLOGY 342 (1962); Kubie, Comment-Implications for Legal Procedure of the
Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U. PA. L. Rv. 59 (1959); Redmount, The Psy-
chological Basis of Evidence Practices: Memory, 50 Cium. L. COMMENTS & ADsTRAcTs
265 (1959); S. FREUD, Psycho-Analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law,
in 2 CO. ECTED PAPERs OF SIGMUND FREUD 13 (1906).
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army of philosophers, scholars and practitioners who sought to
topple the dominance of the written procedure of the jus com-
mune and to replace it by modern systems, built on publicity,
free evaluation of evidence and direct oral communications be-
tween the court and the litigants. Today the battle is over. It
ended with an impressive victory for orality both in the East and
West. Remaining islands of resistance will disappear sooner or
later. Yesteryear's broad approach to the principle of orality
tends to assign to it an ideological significance which it has no
longer. Today, we can afford to look at orality soberly as one of
two alternative forms of procedural communications, each serving
justice in its own way. No one will deny that orderly procedure
must, in part at least, depend on writings which have the ad-
vantage of permanence, easy verification and reviewability.
While there is no need to elevate orality to an immutable
postulate of legal policy, one should not, on the other hand, un-
derrate its importance. Orality is a concept of great versatility
whose usefulness extends over a large area. It would be a mistake
to believe that oral proof-taking before the triers of fact exhausts
its potentialities. In this paper some of the functions of orality in
civil procedure in Austria and the United States have been de-
scribed and compared from a strictly functional point of view,
keeping in mind the purpose served and the effect on other govern-
ing principles of procedure.

